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Roderick M. Hills, Jr. 3 
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have written a fair-
minded and heartfelt polemic against what they call "radical 
multiculturalism" in the legal academy. According to the 
authors, "radical multiculturalism" is the belief that all 
"objective" standards of factual accuracy, academic or profes-
sional merit, or legal coherence are merely "social construc-
tions," meaning that they are really nothing but "exercises of 
power by one group over another." (p. 118) Rather than strive 
to conform to such standards, radical multiculturalism maintains 
that scholars should expose them for what they are-the efforts 
of white, heterosexual males to subordinate gay and lesbian per-
sons, African-Americans and other racial minorities, or women. 
Beyond All Reason attacks this radical multiculturalist 
strain in legal academia, not because the radical's critique is un-
true but because it has bad consequences. According to Beyond 
All Reason, "the radicals' attachment to social constructionism 
and related doctrines" undermines attainment of "the radicals' 
own progressive goals." (p. 7) The book maintains that radical 
multiculturalism has dangerous (albeit unintended) anti-Semitic 
and anti-Asian implications, because it casts doubt on the basis 
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of Jews' and Asian-Americans' intellectual achievements. The 
book also argues that radical multiculturalism leads its practi-
tioners to engage in a paranoid style of argument, in which 
threats of excommunication are used to stifle free and open de-
bate and one's "authenticity" as a representative of one's sexual 
or racial group counts for more than factual accuracy or logical 
consistency. 
As an effort to describe and deplore a certain strain in the 
legal academy, Beyond All Reason has many virtues. It is scru-
pulously honest in its quotation of the radical multiculturalists 
that it attacks, its tone is never shrill, and the style is refreshingly 
unpretentious. Moreover, the book's evidence supports its con-
clusions: Farber and Sherry provide a depressingly long cata-
logue of egregiously silly posturing by radical multiculturalists, a 
list of quotes worthy of a character out of a Tom Wolfe novel. 
(My personal favorite is Richard Delgado's remark that "if you 
are black or Mexican, you should flee Enlightenment-based de-
mocracies like mad, assuming you have any choice," because 
"racism and enlightenment are the same thing." (p. 29)) 
Beyond All Reason, however, is ultimately unsatisfying, be-
cause it provides no serious evaluation of the truth of radical 
multiculturalism's foundational claims. For authors who claim 
to value truth, Farber and Sherry seem curiously indifferent to 
it: they exhibit a world-weary anti-intellectualism that is strik-
ingly similar to the attitudes of the radical multiculturalists that 
they criticize. They concede that radical multiculturalism's 
claims about objectivity, truth, and merit are "astoundingly 
powerful," and they seem to believe that any effort to disprove 
the truth of such claims would be futile. Instead, they stake 
their entire attack on radical multiculturalism on the argument 
that its tenets are dangerous-that they will have bad conse-
quences like anti-Semitism, shrill and unintelligible scholarship, 
and sloppiness about factual accuracy. As I shall suggest below 
in Part II of this review, this argument from consequences is not 
a successful strategy. Farber and Sherry seem far too defensive, 
too lacking in confidence about their notions of truth and value, 
to mount a convincing defense of Enlightenment and academic 
dialogue, both of which, after all, are predicated on the idea that 
the impartial pursuit of truth and justice is a sensible and 
worthwhile undertaking. In a larger sense, Farber and Sherry 
unintentionally expose a weakness of the version of conven-
tional "Enlightenment liberalism" dominant in the legal acad-
emy- an inability to respond persuasively to radical challenges 
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because of an anemic conception of truth and value. In this 
sense, Farber and Sherry share in the Trahison des Clercs that 
they so effectively describe. 
I 
Before one criticizes the book, it is useful to give an over-
view of its major claims. Beyond All Reason consists of six 
chapters. The first two chapters summarize some tenets of radi-
cal multiculturalism, while chapters 3, 4, and 5 argue that these 
tenets lead to various unacceptable consequences, such as anti-
Semitism, indifference to factual accuracy, and the breakdown 
of civil discourse. Finally, chapter 6 dissects radical multicul-
turalism to explain why such an ideology might appeal to legal 
academics despite these harmful consequences. 
The first chapter provides a fair and concise summary of the 
ideology that the book later attacks. Farber and Sherry contend 
that the intellectual foundation of radical multiculturalism is the 
premise that "reality is socially constructed by the powerful in 
order to perpetuate their own hegemony." (p. 23) Under this 
view, statements about social institutions are not "objective." 
Rather, they are tools by which the persons currently dominant 
in society- the "white male establishment"- maintain their 
dominance. Statements about "justice", "merit", and "truth" in 
reality serve the interests of social elites. Even the concepts of 
knowledge and empirical proof are "constructed" by powerful 
elites in order to impose their view of the world on less powerful 
persons. (p. 27) Judgments about empirical proof or academic 
merit do not reflect any objective reality about the world. 
Rather, they reflect the "mindset" of the dominant social 
groups-their "bundles of presuppositions, received wisdoms, 
and shared understandings." (p. 29) (citation omitted) 
Radical multiculturalists, in spite of their skeptical attitude 
toward values like objectivity and scientific inquiry traditionally 
associated with the European Enlightenment, remain inexplica-
bly loyal to the Enlightenment ideal of egalitarianism. They 
seek to promote a more egalitarian society and prevent white 
male heterosexual elites from dominating less powerful groups. 
Toward this end, radical multiculturalists urge scholars to reject 
putatively objective standards for assessing law, academic merit, 
or factual accuracy and instead provide narratives or stories that 
inspire subordinated communities to resist white male hegem-
ony. (pp. 38-41) Scholarship, according to the radical multicul-
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turalists, is really a species of rhetoric, to be evaluated by its ef-
fectiveness in creating an egalitarian society. Radical multicul-
turalists also maintain that one's membership in ethnic, sexual 
or gender groups crucially affects one's ability to provide or ap-
preciate such rhetoric: white male scholars may be incapable of 
understanding or evaluating the narratives of women or people 
of color, while membership in an oppressed social group may 
constitute "virtually a presumption of expertise" in under-
standing such narratives. (pp. 30-31) (citation omited) 
What practical consequences does such a theory have for 
the study of the law? Farber and Sherry argue in chapter 2 that 
radical multiculturalist legal theory has four notable features, 
two of which are highly general and two of which concern more 
specific legal doctrines. First, radical multiculturalist theory 
charges that traditional legal reasoning is really rooted in the 
protection of white and male self-interest: the mindset of mostly 
white and male judges leads them to use the law to protect the 
interests of other white male persons. (pp. 36-38) Second, radi-
cal multiculturalists prefer emotionally stirring narratives to 
blander, more dispassionate accounts of how the law operates. 
(pp. 38-40) Third, radical multiculturalists recommend that tra-
ditional First Amendment doctrine be modified to permit sup-
pression of speech that may be thought to contribute to the 
stigmatization of oppressed social groups. For example porno-
graphy or racial hate speech should be more easily restricted or 
banned. (pp. 40-45) Fourth and finally, because the white, 
male, heterosexual mindsets are often unconscious, courts 
should hold that laws can deprive persons of equal protection 
even when such laws are not enacted with any intentional hos-
tility toward some ethnic group, women, or homosexuals. 
(pp. 45-47) 
Farber and Sherry assert without explanation that this ide-
ology of radical multiculturalism is "astoundingly powerful," 
(p. 23) but, as noted above, they never attempt to evaluate its 
intellectual merits. Instead, they makes three different argu-
ments in the third, fourth, and fifth chapters respectively that 
radical multiculturalism undermines radical multiculturalists' 
own commitment to egalitarianism. 
The first (and, as I suggest below, the weakest) of these ar-
guments is Farber's and Sherry's claim, set forth in chapter 3, 
that radical multiculturalism's attack on the ideal of objective 
merit is anti-Semitic and anti-Asian. The foundation for this ar-
gument is the fact that Jews and Asian-Americans are over-
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represented in academic, intellectual, professional, and eco-
nomic life relative to their share of the United States popula-
tion. According to Farber and Sherry, given the radical mul-
ticulturalists' premise that academic standards are the result of 
an illegitimate exercise of power, "[t]he radical multiculturalists 
cannot account for this success without attributing it to the exer-
cise of power by Jews and Asian Americans." (p. 58) In short, 
if objective standards of merit are the result of a conspiracy, 
then they are necessarily the result of a Jewish-Asian conspir-
acy, for Jews and Asians are the beneficiaries of such stan-
dards-and, of course, the Jewish conspiracy is the leitmotif of 
anti-Semitism. 
In chapter 4, Farber and Sherry provide a second attack on 
radical multiculturalism, by arguing against radical multicul-
turalists' view that scholarship should be concerned with per-
sonal stories rather than objective truth. According to Farber 
and Sherry, this concern with narratives "discourages fruitful 
debate in several ways while at the same time making it easier 
for these [radical multicultural] scholars comfortably to reaffirm 
their preconceptions." (p. 73) The authors note that personal-
ized stories about individuals' experience with racism or sexism 
may not accurately reflect what typically occurs in the real world 
as revealed by more systematic statistical studies. The radical 
multiculturalists' concern with narratives is especially danger-
ous, according to Farber and Sherry, because radical multicul-
turalist scholarship tend to be obsessed with whether such narra-
tives "authentically" reflects the distinctive experience or his or 
her ethnic or sexual group. Such an obsession, in tum, results in 
a sort of shrill, denunciatory style of argument in which oppo-
nents are excommunicated rather than refuted-accused of be-
ing traitors to their race or gender (if they are minorities or 
women) or of being blinded by the false consciousness of the 
prevailing white and male "mindset" (if they are white or male). 
(pp. 78-84) Farber and Sherry also note that personalized narra-
tives can often be unintelligible, and they complain that radical 
multiculturalism's theory of knowledge-that knowledge is ul-
timately based on personal emotional reaction-makes it impos-
sible for readers who do not belong to radical multiculturalist's 
racial or sexual group to evaluate or even respond to the radical 
multiculturalist narratives. (pp. 87-90) 
Farber's and Sherry's final attack on radical multicultural-
ism contained in chapter 5 maintains that radical multicultural-
ists' denial of the notion of objective truth leads them to take a 
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casual attitude toward the distinction between fact and fiction in 
their scholarship. This is not to say that radical multiculturalists 
deliberately spread lies. Rather, Farber and Sherry maintain 
that radical multiculturalists simply do not care enough about 
insuring that their scholarship draws a sharp distinction between 
false and true statements: radical multiculturalists, according to 
Farber and Sherry tend to be sloppy about the truth. As evi-
dence of this tendency, Farber and Sherry cite Patricia Williams' 
statement that "Tawana Brawley has been the victim of some 
unspeakable crime," regardless of whether she was really raped 
by six white men. Farber and Sherry note that, even if there is 
deep sense in which Tawana Brawley was the victim of a crime, 
it is critically important to evaluate whether her rape accusation 
is true-not least in order to vindicate the reputations of six in-
nocent men who have been defamed if, as a grand jury believed, 
the accusations were false. (pp. 95-98) 
According to Farber and Sherry, Williams' apparent indif-
ferenc~ to this distinction between truth and falsity is not simply 
a singular case of rhetorical excess: it is, rather, symptomatic of 
radical multiculturalism's principle that objective truth is a 
white, male, and heterosexual social construction. To support 
this claim, Farber and Sherry cite four historical inaccuracies 
contained in radical multiculturalist scholarship, as well as the 
more general tendency of radical multiculturalist authors to dis-
count or ignore the value of statistical evidence that contradicts 
their positions on, for instance, law school hiring practices or the 
effects of single-parent families on children's well-being. (pp. 
100-102) Farber and Sherry conclude the chapter by arguing 
that truth-seeking is useful to a democracy. For instance, they 
argue that, if one abandons the distinction between truth and 
falsehood, then one will lose an objective standard by which to 
assess the lies told by tyrants to consolidate their power. 
(p. 103) To illustrate the point, the authors note that a college 
newspaper editor has justified her decision to publish the ads of 
"Holocaust deniers" by using "radical multiculturalist lan-
guage," arguing that "the deniers are simply revisionists who are 
'reinterpreting history."' (p. 109) (citation omitted) Farber and 
Sherry also insist that "the scientific method" and a "willingness 
to search for truth" promotes habits of mind useful for demo-
cratic citizenship "such as open-mindedness, humility, tolerance, 
and an awareness of obligations beyond self-interest." (p. 107) 
The sixth chapter of Beyond All Reason is devoted to diag-
nosing radical multiculturalism- that is, trying to figure out why 
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radical multiculturalism persists in attracting legal scholars de-
spite its perverse consequences. The authors conclude that the 
ideology's foundational rejection of objective standards makes it 
particularly intellectually insular and immune from rational 
challenge, (pp. 120-127) while its tenets provide psychological 
comfort to academics who wish massively to expand affirmative 
action in law school admissions and hiring, because those tenets 
deny that such expansion would be accompanied by any real 
costs. (pp. 127-133) The authors conclude their diagnosis with 
the observation that radical multiculturalism constitutes a par-
ticularly difficult form of mindset to uproot, because it resem-
bles a species of paranoia-a self-sealing obsession that a perva-
sive conspiracy controls all law and all modes of reasoning. 
(pp. 133-137) 
II 
A central problem with Beyond All Reason is that it focuses 
entirely on the rhetorical consequences of radical multicultural-
ism rather than on its intellectual merits. With a practical law-
yers' disdain for intellectual abstractions, Farber and Sherry ab-
stain from any serious analysis of radical multiculturalism's 
claims about the social construction of reality beyond conceding 
inexplicably, that such claims are "astoundingly powerful." 
(p. 23) According to the authors, any such investigation into 
"the truth of the radical multiculturalist ideas" would be futile, 
because "[i]t is the very concept of 'truth' that is in dispute" -a 
dispute that, the authors seem to believe, is unresolvable. 
(p. 50) Maybe radical multiculturalism has flaws in its reason-
ing, Farber and Sherry concede, but who cares? "[H]aving philo-
sophical problems does not necessarily distinguish radical mul-
ticulturalism from any other jurisprudential approach." (p. 7) 
Instead, the authors "prefer to ask whether [radical multicul-
turalism] ... is wise politics" -whether it is a good way to "seek 
the best life for a community" (p. 50)-apparently on the odd 
assumption that it is easier to produce consensus on disputes 
about politics than epistemology. 
The result of such an emphasis on practical consequences 
rather than truth is that Beyond All Reason is likely to forfeit 
the attention of its most likely audience-academics. Academ-
ics pride themselves on being tough-minded thinkers who will 
accept unpleasant consequences if they believe that such conse-
quences follow from the most intellectually sophisticated view of 
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the world. Indeed, they might revel in the discouraging conse-
quences of a world-view, because their acceptance of such con-
sequences seems like proof that they are tough, Nietzchean 
thinkers, free from the laypersons' need to cling to comfortable 
superstitions. Thus, when Farber and Sherry argue for the rejec-
tion of Radical Multiculturalism on the ground that radical mul-
ticulturalism produces unpleasant consequences- illiberal, 
shrill, tendentious scholarship-they do not really address mul-
ticulturalism's central conceit that it unsparingly "unmasks" the 
reality behind notions like objectivity and impartiality. Given 
that Farber and Sherry abstain from challenging the tenets of 
radical multiculturalism on their merits, is it really a refutation 
of them to say that they make us uncomfortable or undermine 
our conventional understanding of "democratic constitutional-
ism" or that they lead to shrill, tendentious, unempirical scholar-
ship? Maybe these consequences are the price we have to pay to 
remain tough-minded Nietzchean intellectuals who unflinch-
ingly accept the world as it is, free from illusory concepts of ob-
jectivity and impartiality. 
Each of the three arguments against radical multicultural-
ism is seriously weakened by this refusal to engage the intellec-
tual foundation of radical multiculturalism. Take, for instance, 
the argument in chapter 3 that radical multiculturalism is anti-
Semitic. As a preliminary matter, one might note that Farber's 
and Sherry's argument is, itself, tendentious at best. They rea-
son that, if (1) conventional academic standards are the result of 
a conspiracy to exclude members of racial minorities and (2) 
Jews and Asian-Americans disproportionately succeed under 
conventional academic standards, then it follows that (3) Jews 
and Asian-Americans must somehow be a party to the racist 
conspiracy. But, even assuming that the first premise is a cor-
rect statement of radical multiculturalist arguments (which 
seems doubtfult, the conclusion does not follow from the 
premises. The disproportionate success of Jews and Asians 
might simply be a fortuitous rather than intended result of the 
whites' efforts to exclude African-Americans. It might be that 
white Anglo-Saxon males lack the political or social power to 
reserve academic jobs for themselves with an express color bar. 
4. The central claim of radical multiculturalists is not that white academics ex-
clude minority candidates for academic positions because of deliberate racism but rather 
because they are led by their unconscious "white mindset" to overlook the importance 
of minority scholars' achievements. Farber's and Sherry's argument concerning anti-
Semitism does nothing to address this more subtle claim. 
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Instead, whites choose an ostensibly race-neutral standard-
good grades, high test scores, etc.- that they predict will dispro-
portionately benefit themselves. Jews and Asians might fortui-
tously happen to achieve disproportionate success under the 
standard chosen by the whites (perhaps because Jewish and 
Asian tradition, religion or culture encourages Jewish and Asian 
children to cultivate an interest in being highly literate and 
skilled at the interpretation of texts). It hardly follows that the 
disproportionate success of Jewish candidates is somehow the 
result of a Jewish or Asian conspiracy or even the intended re-
sult of a white conspiracy. 
Farber's and Sherry's response to this possibility for fortui-
tous Jewish or Asian-American success is obscure. They seem 
to argue that fortuitous Jewish or Asian-American success is 
ruled out by the radical multiculturalists' premise that "white 
gentiles impose standards of merit to solidify their own power." 
(p. 60) Apparently, Farber and Sherry argue that, because 
whites are (by hypothesis) capable of controlling access to aca-
demic positions, Jews and Asian-Americans could not surpass 
whites unless whites deliberately decided to bestow such a bene-
fit upon them. But this assertion does not follow from any radi-
cal multicultural premise: it might be that whites simply cannot 
use a more precise standard without betraying their purpose of 
racial exclusion. Thus, they have to use a cruder proxy for 
whiteness, one that unfortunately (in the views of white gentiles) 
admits a lot of Jews. It is hard to see why such a conspiracy the-
ory implicates Jews in white racism or even suggests that Jews or 
Asian-Americans are the stooges of racist whites.5 
In short, the argument that radical multiculturalism has 
anti-Semitic implications seems, at best, to be the highly specu-
lative product of Farber's and Sherry's imagination rather than a 
genuine risk of adhering to multicultural ideas. But, quite apart 
from its implausibility, it is odd that Farber and Sherry prefer to 
plunge into the morass of identity politics and draw byzantine 
inferences of anti-Semitism from implausible multiculturalist 
5. To be fair, Farber and Sherry provide some evidence that white gentiles have 
used criteria to reduce the success of Jewish college applicants, such as requirements of 
geographic diversity or pedigree or "character." They contend that the deployment of 
such standards indicates that Jews could not succeed without the active acquiescence of 
white gentiles. But the natural response is that such ostensibly race- or religion-neutral 
criteria obviously did not prevent substantial Jewish success in college admissions, either 
because their invidious purpose was detected and the standards were repealed or be-
cause Jewish applicants overcame the disability of such criteria. These facts do not show 
that white gentiles have infinite capacity to manipulate the system for their own benefit. 
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conspiracy theories rather than simply defend the concept of 
objective merit in a straightforward way. As I shall argue below 
in Part III, the obvious objection to the radical multiculturalists' 
theory of merit is that it rests on an incoherent theory of knowl-
edge and meaning. Yet Farber and Sherry somehow feel that 
such objections are foreclosed to them by the "astoundingly 
powerful" nature of radical multicultural arguments. It is a 
mark of how much they are willing to concede to the relativism 
of their opponents that they instead insist on making their case 
against radical multiculturalism through their own tortured in-
ferences from the logic of identity politics. 
The same criticism applies to Farber's and Sherry's argu-
ments in chapters 4 and 5 that radical multiculturalism under-
mines commitment to public discourse and truth. By contrast 
with the "anti-Semitism" argument in chapter 3, these argu-
ments in chapters 4 and 5 are at least supported by quotes from 
multiculturalist scholarship, which indicate that radical multicul-
turalists are prone to shrill denunciations of opponents, unintel-
ligible narratives, witch hunts into writers' lack of racial 
"authenticity," and ideologically convenient self-delusion about 
the facts. Moreover, Farber and Sherry plausibly suggest that 
these tendencies are not aberrations but rather the natural con-
sequences of radical multiculturalism's foundational premises-
its emphasis that all knowledge is really nothing more than the 
"mindset" of some social or racial group. The difficulty with 
Farber's and Sherry's arguments, however, is that, because Be-
yond All Reason refuses to challenge the intellectual truth of 
those foundational premises, the book cannot provide any inter-
esting reasons to believe that shrillness, factual inaccuracy, etc., 
are adequate grounds for rejecting multicultural scholarship. 
Take, for example, Farber's and Sherry's claim in chapter 4 
that radical multiculturalists distort debate with their "stress on 
legal storytelling." (p. 73) Farber and Sherry argue that reli-
ance on personal narratives tends to impede constructive debate 
about the truth or value of social policy, because there is no way 
to verify or evaluate the personal narratives on which radical 
multicultural scholarship tends to rely. But the whole point of 
radical multiculturalism is to transform the style and method of 
academic debate to reflect the alleged reality that scholarly posi-
tions are really a function of the authors' race, gender, or sexu-
ality. Therefore, it is hardly a devastating blow to their founda-
tional premises to say that they would undermine traditional 
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academic dialogue. That's what radical multiculturalists want to 
do. 
Moreover, by refusing to make the intellectual case against 
radical multiculturalist premises about truth, meaning, and 
merit, Farber and Sherry substantially undermine any reason to 
be concerned about the distortion of academic debate caused by 
narratives. After all, if multicultural theories of truth and 
meaning are correct, then it would follow that conventional aca-
demic dialogue achieves only a spurious and illusory progress 
toward any meaningful truth. Why, then, be worried that the 
tendencies of radical multiculturalism undermine such a useless 
social practice as academic dialogue? Worrying about the loss of 
honest and open debate without defending the notion of objec-
tive truth is like worrying about the quality of one's stereo sys-
tem while being indifferent to music. 
The argument in chapter 5 suffers from the same weakness: 
without a defense of the concept of truth, the authors cannot 
easily show why one should worry about the concept's loss. One 
can concede for the sake of argument that Farber and Sherry 
might be correct that the idea of objective truth has democratic 
virtues; perhaps democracy thrives best when voters and politi-
cians believe that their descriptions of reality are "objective" in 
that they transcend race and gender. But this argument puts the 
cart before the horse: a belief cannot be useful for democracy 
unless people actually believe it, and people will generally not 
believe something that is demonstrably implausible. Therefore, 
Farber's and Sherry's argument in favor of the notion of objec-
tivity goes nowhere until they show that such a notion is persua-
sive or coherent-that is, true. One might as well construct a 
defense of the concept of Heaven and Hell on the grounds that 
these ideas, if believed, would promote democracy by discour-
aging anti-democratic conduct with the threat of eternal damna-
tion. Maybe they would-but if one can make no persuasive ar-
gument that such beliefs are true, then the notion of an afterlife 
will provide very little support for democracy, for no one will 
believe it. Likewise, if the concept of objective truth really is an 
implausible fiction and multicultural relativism is, in fact, a per-
suasive account of our world and beliefs, then democrats and 
egalitarians ought to construct a defense of democracy and 
equality that does not depend on such weak reeds such as the 
theory of objective truth. In short, Farber and Sherry seem to 
engage in what Leo Strauss called the reductio ad Hitlerum- the 
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fallacy that an argument is sufficiently refuted if it was made by, 
or might benefit, Hitler. 
In any case, even as a consequentialist argument, Farber's 
and Sherry's case for "truth" is underwhelming for two reasons. 
First, there is no real evidence that those who believe in radical 
multicultural theories of truth and meaning inevitably or even 
usually turn against constitutional democracy. As Farber and 
Sherry note in passing, (p. 20-21) radical multiculturalist schol-
ars tend to favor enforcement of conventional constitutional 
rights: critical race scholars objected to Critical Legal Studies 
precisely because CLS "trashed" conventional constitutional 
rights that might protect racial minorities from racist govern-
ments. In other words, radical multiculturalists seem perfectly 
capable of simultaneously endorsing their strange relativism 
rooted in the epigoni of Foucault and Derrida and also sup-
porting conventional democratic and constitutional norms. 
Second, Farber and Sherry present only a weak and uncon-
vincing case that the concept of "objective truth" promotes de-
mocracy. Part of the trouble is that Farber and Sherry have an 
impoverished notion of what it means for statements to be 
"objectively true" (meaning, one supposes, non-transitory, reli-
able, or persuasive). They seem to define "objective truth" to 
mean truth as established through some sort of "scientific 
method." According to Beyond All Reason, "the scientific 
method" is good for democracy because "empirical experimen-
tation designed to approach objective truth" promotes a skepti-
cal attitude towards "institutional authority": "[i]n science as in 
democracy, what matters is not who says it but whether it is 
right. We are all free to reject another's beliefs, and no dogma 
is too sacred to challenge." (p. 107) 
Why is such a destruction of institutional authority good for 
democracy, which, after all, presumably rests on the authority of 
democratic institutions? With unintentional irony, Farber and 
Sherry support the democratic credentials of scientific skepti-
cism about authority only by citing authorities-namely, a para-
graph of statements by John Dewey and another paragraph of 
quotes from a law professor, William Marshall. But, despite the 
distinguished citations, this encomium to scientific skepticism as 
the best promoter of democracy seems positively perverse. Af-
ter all, if skepticism is the cardinal virtue of democracy, then one 
would think that radical multiculturalism would be even more 
democratic than the scientific method, because radical multicul-
turalism is even more skeptical about claims of truth and merit. 
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If one really wants citizens with open minds "free to reject one 
another's beliefs" (including presumably beliefs favoring de-
mocracy), then the radical skepticism of Foucault and Derrida 
might be just the thing we need to perfect democracy. 
Of course, Farber and Sherry might respond that they sup-
port a happy medium-not the post-modern "nihilistic" skepti-
cism of the radical multiculturalists but rather the moderate 
skepticism of the scientific method. They might argue that, 
while citizens should be skeptical about the claims of liars and 
tyrants, they should not be senselessly skeptical about democ-
racy and the truth. But this argument surely underestimates the 
corrosive tendency of the "scientific method." One might argue 
in opposition that modern scientific rationality, at least as it is 
widely understood by social scientists since Max Weber,6 actu-
ally undermines democratic values-indeed, all values-by 
maintaining that statements about values are either unjustifiable 
or at least less justifiable than statements about facts. To the ex-
tent that democracy relies on values-say, the value of human 
equality, self-rule, and government through the consent of the 
governed-positivist science would seem to undermine rather 
than strengthen such values by relegating them to the status of 
mere preferences incapable of principled justification. As Ste-
ven Smith has argued in a recent book, it is not obvious whether 
modern democratic constitutionalism can survive such value-
skepticism.7 
In sum, it is difficult to say that the relativism purveyed by 
radical multiculturalists is obviously worse for democracy and 
equality than the scientistic skepticism promoted by Farber and 
Sherry. Since both Farber and Sherry and most radical multicul-
turalists endorse constitutional democracy, it is hard to believe 
that the fate of democracy hangs in the balance of their dispute. 
This is not to say that Farber and Sherry have not usefully col-
lected evidence that radical multiculturalist scholars frequently 
engage in shrill, dogmatic scholarship rife with baffling narra-
6. For Weber's statement and justification of the fact-value distinction, see Max 
Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch, 
eds. and trans., The Free Press, 1949). 
7. Steven D. Smith, The Constitution and the Pride of Reason (Oxford U. Press, 
1998). For a cogent description of how positivist science might threaten democratic Iib-
e~alism, see G. K. Chesterton, The Poetic Quality in Liberalism, 5 The Independent Re-
view 53 (Feb.-Apr. 1905). As Chesterton notes, "Science, properly speaking, knows 
nothing, for instance, of 'the Rights of Man' ideal. Pure science does not admit the exis-
tence of the Rights of Man. Pure science, indeed, does not admit the existence of Man 
at all. 'Man' is only the gross name we give to a certain patch in the tapestry of evolu-
tion, which shades away into other things by nameless gradations." Id. at 61. 
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tives, obsessions with psychological "authenticity," and witch 
hunts for traitors to the canonical racial, sexual, and gender 
groups. Beyond All Reason provides an honest catalogue of 
some serious intellectual breakdowns. At an intuitive level, 
candid readers can sense that something is radically amiss with 
radical multicultural scholarship simply by reading the multicul-
tural material quoted in Beyond All Reason. But, beyond such 
common-sense intuitions, Farber and Sherry provide no argu-
ments against radical multiculturalism's follies that would per-
suade anyone who is remotely inclined to take the multicul-
turalists seriously. 
III 
Farber and Sherry might rightly respond that my objections 
to their methodology are pointless unless I can come up with a 
better way to address the arguments of radical multiculturalist 
theories of truth and merit. If Farber and Sherry are correct 
that any debate about such matters would be fruitless, then it is 
merely churlish to find fault with their approach. 
But I believe that Farber and Sherry give up too easily. 
Both they and radical multiculturalists ignore a rich literature 
from the philosophy of mind and language indicating that the 
foundational premises of radical multiculturalism are deeply 
confused. Moreover, these arguments against relativism have a 
special virtue: rather than contesting the claim that our concepts 
are "socially constructed," these arguments suggest how the very 
fact of "social construction" makes cultural relativism incoher-
ent. But to explain this point adequately, one needs to say a bit 
more about "social construction" and how it might preclude the 
sort of relativism urged by multiculturalism. In what follows, I 
will sketch a crude picture of how several philosophers think 
about language. This picture necessarily distorts this philo-
sophical thinking, the essence of which is that concepts cannot 
be captured in formulae or pat summaries. But my hope is that 
such distortion will point the way toward a cure for an even 
cruder distortion prevalent in radical multicultural scholarship. 
It has been a commonplace since at least the publication of 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations to note that the ap-
plication of our concepts cannot be explained by formulae or 
"assertibility conditions" contained in a single language user's 
brain. Rather, the application of concepts depends on what 
Wittgenstein called a "form of life" -meaning the practices, 
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habits, interests, values, beliefs, attitudes, points of salience, etc., 
of a community of language users. In this sense, contrary to 
Farber's and Sherry's assertion, one can say that all of our 
terms-not only terms referring to social institutions, but also 
logical rules, natural kinds like "water" and "gold," proper 
names like "Mount Everest" -are "socially constructed": they 
are intelligible only when one takes for granted a myriad of so-
cial practices and background assumptions. But, to avoid easy 
platitudes about "language games," "forms of life," "meaning as 
use," and so forth, all of which can so easily be a substitute for 
thinking, it is useful to rehearse the arguments, familiar though 
they might be. After I explain how language might depend on 
our social practices, I will then suggest that this very dependence 
precludes the sort of relativism that radical multiculturalists 
want to defend. 
Consider, first, why learning language might seem mysteri-
ous. One might think that this is a simple matter: one could 
learn the definition of a word by seeing someone skilled at a 
language point at a thing-say, Mount Everest-and utter some 
sound from the language-say, "Mount Everest." This 
"ostensive definition" -pointing-would inform one that the 
sound referred to the thing. Having seen the word applied to 
the thing, I can now properly apply "Mount Everest" to the 
thing by making statements such as "Mount Everest has snow at 
its peak." 
But here is the mystery: how can I know that I am using the 
name "Mount Everest" properly-that I am following the rule 
for the word's use that was laid out by the definer when she 
pointed her finger at Mount Everest? The answer is not self-
evident. One has to interpret the pointing gesture to extract the 
rule from it. Was the definer pointing at a particular mountain, 
the entire Himalayan range, the planet earth? Or maybe some 
combination of these items with the time of day, temperature, 
season, and so forth? Or perhaps the gesture was intended to 
denote something behind the speaker or above her: it is not self-
evident that extending an index finger means that one wishes to 
draw listeners' attention to items in the trajectory of the finger's 
tip. One might try to examine all the cases in which the pointer 
used the term "Mount Everest" and pointed her finger to see 
what they all had in common. But, as W.V.O. Quine famously 
explained, one could interpret every sentence in which "Mount 
Everest" is uttered to refer to everything in the universe except 
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Mount Everest and produce a logically consistent set of sen-
tences.8 
In short, it seems mysterious how one could acquire the 
definition of a word from finger-pointing alone. One can repro-
duce the same mystery if one tries to explain how we use words 
by arguing that we carry a definition of the word's proper uses in 
our heads-a list of "truth conditions" or "assertibility condi-
tions" that tell us when to utter the words. Under this view, one 
might attempt to explain the mastery of a word like "Mount Ev-
erest" by a set of criteria that one carries with one in one's 
memory-say, "the mountain climbed by Sir Edmund Hilary in 
1953" or "the tallest mountain in the world." When one wishes 
to use the word in a particular situation, one first consults the 
list to see if the use is appropriate. This picture of language, 
however, will fail for the same reason that the simple picture of 
ostensive definition fails. The list of criteria, after all, would 
seem to require interpretation just as much as the world of 
which I wish to speak. If I need a list of criteria in order to 
choose the right words with which to talk about the world, then 
why do I not also need instructions in order to select the right 
list of criteria? Then I face a dilemma: if I need such instruc-
tions, then there is an obvious prospect of an infinite regress. 
On the other hand, if the list of criteria is self-explanatory, then 
why cannot the world also be self-explanatory? The list is either 
superfluous or inadequate. 
And yet there is no use denying the obvious: we seem to 
speak to each other. The point of the via negativa is not to es-
tablish solipsism but rather to show that "[i]nterpretations by 
themselves do not determine meaning" because the interpreta-
tion "hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot 
give it any support."9 The meaning of words does not come 
packaged in a neat list of assertibility conditions or paragraphs 
from a dictionary or any other abstract formula. Then where 
does it come from? Wittgenstein10 famously tells us that meaning 
8. See W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Harvard U. Press, 1990). 
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 198 (G.E.M. Anscombe, 
trans., Macmillan Company, 3d ed. 1958). 
10. There is a cottage industry of interpreting Wittgenstein's delphic writings. I am 
neither qualified nor inclined to attempt any contribution to this industry's output: the 
interpretation offered here is (or, at least, is intended to be) substantially identical to the 
view of Wittgenstein's writings offered by Hilary Putnam and Jonathan Lear. See 
Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question 27-56 (Blackwell, 1995); Hilary Putnam, 
Words and Life 264-77 (James Conant ed., Harvard U. Press, 1995); Hilary Putnam, Re-
view of The Concept of a Person, in 2 Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers 
132-38 (Cambridge U. Press, 1975); Jonathan Lear, Transcendental Anthropology in 
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is rooted in our "form of life"11 -our whole culture, social prac-
tices, customs, desires, values, beliefs, interests, points of sali-
ence, institutions, etc. These interests- "the fixed point of real 
need"- and not lists of assertibility conditions, truth conditions, 
or any other relatively circumscribed set of linguistic artifacts 
that breaths life into our words. Moreover, such interests need 
not be present in our head when we use a word: it is enough that 
they are evident in the acts and customs of language users. If we 
are initiated into the proper use of the language by the commu-
nity, then we can properly apply a concept even when we are 
thinking about something else entirely. Thus, we "blindly"12 ap-
ply our concepts or see the finger point at Mount Everest, be-
cause, given the social meaning of actions in the context of our 
form of life, Mount Everest is the salient item and the direction 
of the finger ought to go from wrist to finger-tip, and that's that. 
No further reason can or need be given: we "have reached bed-
rock, and [our] spade is turned. "13 
How might this notion of a "form of life" preclude the rela-
tivism defended by radical multiculturalists? One might initially 
think, to the contrary, that such a view of language as dependent 
on values, interests, and concerns would actually make relativ-
ism even easier to accept. After all, one might argue that, be-
cause African-American scholars and white scholars have dif-
ferent values, concerns, and interests, they also have mutually 
unintelligible languages with mutually untranslatable concepts 
of truth, merit, and so forth. In other words, one might think 
that different persons could have different forms of life, differ-
ences that would suggest "incommensurable" (meaning non-
translatable) conceptual schemes. This seems to be the notion 
of relativism that radical multicultural scholars want to defend. 
Why is not such a notion completely compatible with Wittgen-
stein's theory of language? 
The problem with such multicultural logic is that the very 
premise that one's language depends for its meaning on one's 
form of life-one's usages, practice, concerns, and so forth-
indicates that no one can intelligibly refer to concepts outside 
their "form of life." The reason is rooted in the theory of 
Subject, Thought, and Context 267-98 (Philip Pettit and John McDowell eds., Clarendon 
Press, 1986). 
11. Wittgenstein at § 241 (cited in note 9). 
12. Wittgenstein at§ 219 (cited in note 9) ("When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I 
obey the rule blindly") (emphasis in original). 
13. Id. at § 217. 
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meaning outlined above. None of our concepts have any coher-
ent application when separated from the social practices that 
help constitute and breathe life into such concepts. It follows 
that no one can sensibly use their concepts such as "language" 
or "meaning" or "mind" to refer to some notion of language, 
meaning, or mind outside of that form of life, for such concepts 
would necessarily be empty sounds, terms devoid of real use in 
the speaker's language. As Wittgenstein notes, "[t)he common 
behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of 
which we interpret an unknown language." 14 Therefore, if some 
alleged word were to be used in ways that bore no relationship 
to such "common behavior of mankind," we could not recognize 
it as language. One cannot tear concepts like "language" and 
"meaning" out of the context of familiar concerns and interests 
that give them life by pretending that we have some abstract 
idea of "language" that can be separated from the familiar uses 
that we make of such words: "[i)f the mental item floats free of 
the use we make of the expression, then it floats free of the 
meaning as well. "15 
To see how the dependence of words on social practices 
limits the possibility of using words to refer to practices that are 
radically distinct from our own, consider an analogy between 
language and the game of baseball. No one doubts that the rules 
of baseball are "socially constructed" in the sense that their con-
tent is rooted in our society's interests, beliefs, practices, values, 
etc. But it does not follow that the rules could be changed in 
any way, no matter how drastic, and still remain intelligible as a 
game.16 For instance, one could probably not imagine the game 
being altered so that the object was to avoid hitting the ball with 
the bat. Any actions that could plausibly stand as evidence for 
such a game (say, batters who never even appeared to care 
about hitting the ball and pitchers who never apparently wished 
to pitch a strike) would be even more plausible evidence that the 
players simply were not playing any intelligible game at all-
that they were simply goofing off in the sandlot without having 
the object of winning the game by missing the ball. In other 
words, because one could not attribute any of the "players"' ac-
tions to any familiar set of concerns and interests, one would not 
14. ld. at§ 206. 
15. Lear, Transcendental Anthropology at 274 (cited in note 10). 
16. For an account of the different senses in which one might use the term "social 
construction," see Sally Haslanger, Ontology and Social Construction, 23 Philosophical 
Topics 95 (Fall 1995). Here, I use the term "social construction" in a sense roughly 
similar to what Haslanger calls "strong pragmatic construction." I d. at 105-108. 
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be justified in attributing to them the motive of playing a game 
with the real purpose of missing the ball. 
Applying these considerations to radical multiculturalist 
claims, it becomes apparent that the dependence of our words 
on our practices precludes the sort of conceptual relativism that 
radical multiculturalists want to defend. Radical multicultural-
ists want to argue that one can intelligibly refer to concepts that 
are coherent in one social group's language yet inaccessible to 
another group. So, for instance, they argue that there can be a 
concept of "merit" or "truth" that is intelligible to, say, African-
Americans but that is inaccessible to white, male scholars. But 
the burden of Wittgenstein's work is to show that this talk of 
radically incommensurable schemes-that is, untranslatable lan-
guages-is meaningless and incoherent. No white male scholar 
is justified in talking about concepts of merit that can in princi-
ple play no role in his form of life, because white, male scholars 
(like everyone else) can use words only to the extent that such 
words are rooted in his everyday practices, assumptions, beliefs 
about the world, and so forth. To talk of other concepts that are 
inaccessible to oneself yet meaningful is to presume that one can 
somehow travel outside one's form of life, viewing it as it were 
from the exterior, and use words like "concept," "language," 
"merit," "truth," and so forth without reference to the myriad of 
assumptions that make one's words meaningful. But this is an 
illusion born of the notion that words gain their meaning from 
abstract dictionary definitions that one carries around in one's 
head rather than the unspoken and unspeakable social practices 
that determine the proper use of words. 
Therefore, when confronted with claims that other persons 
have access to concepts of truth or merit or logic that are in 
principle untranslatable into one's own language or inaccessible 
to oneself, the properly humble assumption is to assume that the 
claimant is speaking gibberish. The reason is simply that one 
must honestly confess one's own limits. Such claims must neces-
sarily be gibberish, because they can by hypothesis play no role 
in one's own form of life and practices. The very premise of 
"social construction" requires one to confess that one's own life 
and practices are all that one has. 
This view that talk of radically incommensurable schemes is 
unintelligible is not simply an inference from the writings of 
Wittgenstein. It is also the view of some of the most influential 
philosophy of language in the United States today. Philosophers 
like Donald Davidson and Hilary Putnam disagree on many im-
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portant points, 17 but they agree that the notion of radically in-
commensurable conceptual schemes is precluded by the de-
pendence of our language on our form of life. For instance, 
Davidson has made essentially this argument against the notion 
of incommensurable conceptual schemes in his essay, On the 
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. The central insight of 
Davidson's essay is that, if a language is in principle untranslat-
able into our own language, then we would cease to be able to 
recognize it as a language at all: "if all we know is what sen-
tences a speaker holds true, and we cannot assume that his lan-
guage is our own, then we cannot take even a first step towards 
interpretation without knowing or assuming a great deal about 
the speaker's beliefs. "18 If we have evidence that the speakers' 
beliefs depart from our own in fundamental ways, making it im-
possible for us to appreciate or translate those beliefs, then this 
is even better evidence that the alleged speaker is no such thing 
at all- that the alleged words really are idle sounds, akin to the 
illusory "baseball" game. This is not because we imperiously 
impose our notions of meaning on other cultures but because we 
humbly cannot extend our own words "language," "meaning," 
and "truth" into areas where the familiar social practices and as-
sumptions that make them meaningful do not apply. 
One might protest that this view of language cannot be cor-
rect, for it seems to eliminate the possibility of principled and 
intelligible disagreement among persons-an absurdity that 
would, indeed, condemn the theory. But the theory has no such 
consequence. Far from precluding disagreement, it makes such 
disagreement possible. Disagreement, after all, is possible only 
if speakers share a world about which they can disagree. As 
Davidson points out, the possibility of meaningful disagreement 
"depends entirely on a foundation-some foundation-in 
agreement. .The agreement may take the form of widespread 
sharing of sentences held true by speakers of 'the same lan-
guage', or agreement in the large mediated by a theory of truth 
17. See Putnam, Words and Life at 64-68 (cited in note 10) (explaining what Put-
nam regards as errors in Davidson's account of language); Donald Davidson, Belief and 
the Basis of Meaning in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 141, 143 (Oarendon 
Press, 1984) (taking issue with Wittgenstein's notion that linguistic meanings ought to be 
explained on the basis of "non-linguistic intentions, uses, purposes, functions, and the 
like" on the grounds that such an account of lapguage would eliminate "theorizing" 
about language). For a discussion of how Wittgenstein's account does not preclude re-
flection about one's linguistic practices, see Lear, Transcendental Anthropology at 293-
98 (cited in note 10). 
18. Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into 
Truth and Interpretation 184, 196 (cited in note 17). 
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contrived by an interpreter for speakers of another language."19 
But widespread agreement must exist for disagreement to be 
possible. 
So, for instance, suppose that I am watching a football game 
with someone who exclaims, "Look at that player! He is off-
sides!" If it is obvious to me that the player is not off-sides, then 
I have two choices available to me. I can assume that my com-
panion understands the use of the term "off-sides" in football 
and has simply made a mistake of fact. Or, if it seems that she 
has as good a view of the field as myself, then I can assume that 
she made no mistake of fact but simply does not understand the 
terminology of football and misused the term "off-sides" to re-
fer to some other, true fact about the player's observed action-
say, "clipping" or "holding" or some other violation of the con-
ventional football rules. But one option is foreclosed to me: I 
cannot say, "While everything in my normal practices, usage in 
football, the context of your statement, and habits of observa-
tion indicate that this player is not 'off-sides' according to my 
concept of 'off-sides,' it is possible that the player is properly de-
scribed as being 'off-sides' according to some other notion of 
'off-sides' that cannot be translated into any words used in my 
language." For me to talk about concepts that are radically un-
translatable in this sense is not merely to talk gibberish (for how 
can I simultaneously admit that the word plays no role in my 
language and yet use the word?) but also to make any meaning-
ful disagreement with my companion impossible. I must simply 
nod and say nothing. 
Put another way, disagreement about matters of fact and 
language has a place within our form of life, provided that the 
disagreement is sufficiently narrow, occurring against a back-
ground of larger agreements. As one removes more of the as-
pects of common culture so that the discussion becomes more 
remote from one's form of life, meaningful disagreement disap-
pears, to be replaced by academic prattle without any real con-
sequences for anyone's actions or beliefs. Many of the radical 
multicultural statements quoted in Beyond All Reason have this 
characteristic. They must be written off as meaningless rather 
than incorrect. For instance, when Gary Peller denies that 
"there is a difference between rational, objective representation 
and interested, biased interpretation," (p. 28) (citation omitted) 
the proper response is to hand him a reliable English dictionary. 
19. Id. at 196-97. 
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If he insists in response that he is using the terms "rational," 
"objective," etc., in a sense different from the ordinary usage, 
then we might ask him to provide an account of his usage in 
terms of our "form of life" -that is, offer a thicker account of 
his claim in conventional English. But if he insists that such 
translation is impossible and refuses to give an intelligible ac-
count of the statement that is false in ordinary English, then 
disagreement is at an end: we must view the statement as 
meaningless gibberish because it is "useless" in Wittgenstein's 
sense of the term, having no real consequences for our lives or 
practices. It is a wheel spinning apart from the machine.20 
IV 
Farber and Sherry are intuitively aware that such inflated 
multicultural rhetoric precludes reasoned debate. This is their 
complaint in chapter 4. But they ignore the voluminous philo-
sophical literature that analyzes such claims of radical incom-
mensurability, and they provide no careful account of what it 
means for a sentence to be "socially constructed." Thus, they in-
explicably contend that scientific statements about the natural 
world are not socially constructed, while they seem to panic at 
the thought that statements about social institutions might be 
socially constructed-all the time ignoring the possibility that all 
sentences might depend on our social practices and concerns for 
their meaning and "social construction" in this sense might not 
be so terrible after all. Instead of analyzing radical multicul-
turalist claims carefully in chapters 1 and 2, they solemnly treat 
such claims as setting forth serious propositions and then engage 
in a sort of intellectual blackmail, threatening us with horrible 
consequences-anti-Semitism, a breakdown of polite debate, 
factual inaccuracy, shrill accusations of racial treason and the 
like-if we dare take such claims seriously. 
But this argument about horrible consequences might be 
exactly backwards. The problem with such abstract rhetoric is 
not the radical consequences that follow, but rather the lack of 
any meaningful consequences. Such abstractions have no seri-
ous role to play in policymaking of race relations. One could 
20. Wittgenstein at § 271 (cited in note 9) ("Imagine a person whose memory 
could not retain what the word 'pain' meant-so that he constantly called different 
things by that name-but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual 
symptoms and presuppositions of pain"- in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should 
like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of 
the mechanism") (emphasis in original). 
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contrast such scholarship with empirical work that makes no 
pretentious claims about meaning but which documents with 
distressing detail the degree to which sexism and racism shape 
American life. Consider, for instance, Nancy Burns' book on 
the incorporation of suburban municipalities in the 1950s and 
1960s, which uses sophisticated statistical inference to show that 
incorporation decisions of suburban residents and developers 
are best explained by racially exclusive purposes. 21 Or consider 
Ian Ayres' research suggesting that bail decisions and used car 
sales are heavi}l influenced by the race or gender of the defen-
dant or buyer. The sheer factual specificity of the data and so-
phistication of statistics in this work makes it far more disturb-
ing-more "critical" -than the now-jejune extrapolations from 
the writings of Derrida and Foucault that characterize the rela-
tivism of radical multicultural scholarship. 
The American academic Left, in short, has had an unfortu-
nate relationship with French social theory, a relationship that 
has drawn it into sterile ground with the false promise of radical 
critique. One suspects that the attraction of such theory owes a 
lot to the intellectual's traditional romance with Paris as the his-
torical home of the heroic intellectual-revolutionary-the city of 
Robespierre, Lamartine orating from the balcony in 1848, the 
June Days, expatriate revolutionaries on the Left Bank, Sartre 
in the cafe, and students on the barricades in '68. Is it any won-
der that law professors would be attracted by these heady con-
notations of romantic radicalism suggested by French social the-
ory, ignoring the comparatively stodgy atmosphere of British 
and American philosophy departments and the dense arguments 
of Donald Davidson, Saul Kripke, Putnam, Tyler Burge, and 
other philosophers of language who spend their time analyzing 
apparently dry matters like Convention-T, the scope of the con-
cept of "arthritis," and the reference of demonstratives? 
Beyond All Reason does little to provide a serious intellec-
tual challenge to French social theory's more bizarre claims. 
The book is a useful, well-written description of an unpromising 
trend in the legal academy, but it provides only the weakest of 
antidotes to cure these maladies. By choosing to rest their ar-
guments exclusively on the dangerous consequence of radical 
21. Nancy Bums, The Formation of American Local Governments: Private Values 
in Public Institutions (Oxford U. Press, 1994). 
22. Ian Ayres and Joel Woldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail 
Setting, 46 Stan L. Rev. 987 (1994); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimi· 
nation in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 8F (1991). 
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multiculturalism, Farber and Sherry have missed an opportunity 
to provoke a much-needed debate on the claims of linguistic 
relativism. 
